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Abstract 
We investigate decentralized collective bargaining in Greece (2002-2016) under the 
industrial relations reform implemented in 2011. We match administrative data on firm-
level contracts with non-participating firms to estimate determinants of decentralized 
bargaining before and after the reform. Decentralized bargaining increased in the post-
reform period depending on firm size, industry and location. Nominal wage floors 
downgraded after 2011 in contacts signed by association of persons rather than trade 
unions. A base wage premium of 22 percent is found in favour of trade unions. Firm-
level bargaining with trade unions is expected to promote decentralized bargaining with 
outcomes linked to firm-specific characteristics.  
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1 Introduction 
The institutional aspects of the collective bargaining system play a central role in the 
determination of nominal wage rigidities. Through collective negotiations firms and 
their employees agree upon adjusting the wage level to their productivity and other 
shocks affecting the firm and the market into which it operates. It is well established 
that under normal economic circumstances nominal wage floors rarely adjust 
downwards. However, Daouli et al. (2016) show that during deep and prolonged 
recessions, such in the case of Greece, the majority of wage floors defined in firm-
level collective agreements downgraded due to firm-specific attributes and specific 
institutional factors. More specifically, a major restructuring of the Greek labour 
relations framework was implemented in October 2011 (Law 4024/2011) which re-
defined the limits within which base wages can oscillate and allowed workers in 
small-sized firms to negotiate over wages at the firm level. Its stated objective was to 
confront the longstanding wage rigidities and bring labour costs in line with firm-
specific productivity and the prevailing labour market conditions. In particular, the 
reform allowed workers in firms that do not meet the requirements (more than 50 
workers) for the establishment of a typical trade union (TU) to form associations of 
persons (AP) and participate into firm-level wage negotiations, as long as they 
represent at least 3/5 of the total workforce. Given the right-skewed firm-size 
distribution of the Greek economy the reform targeted in expanding the institution of 
firm-level bargaining and facilitating the wage adjustment process for the largest part 
of the private sector of the economy. In addition, it allowed for contractual base 
wages to deviate below thresholds set at broader levels of collective bargaining (i.e. 
sectoral, occupational and regional) but not below the national minimum wage 
(NMW) one. 
Shortly after the reform of the collective bargaining framework a dramatic increase in 
the number of firm-level contracts was observed. A detailed description of the 
structure of decentralized bargaining before and after the reform is provided in Daouli 
et al. (2013; 2016) and Vorketisian and Kornelakis (2014). According to the Ministry 
of Labour, Social Security and Welfare, the number of firm-level agreements spiked 
to 976 in 2012 while this number ranged between 63 and 242 in the period 1991-2011 
and between 263 and 409 in the period 2013-2016. At the same time, the number of 
national-wide sectoral and occupational agreements and region-specific occupational 
agreements was considerably lower in the post-reform period. In addition, the 
coverage by collective agreements fell sharply from 83% in 2009 to 42% in 2013 with 
a clear further downward trend (van Ours et al. 2016). With respect to the wage 
settlements in decentralized bargaining, using a unique dataset with firm-level 
contracts for the period 2010-2013, Daouli et al. (2016) show that the direction of 
base wage changes in the post-reform period became negative due to the intention of 
firms to adopt massive reductions following the reduction of the NMW set by the 
state (it was cut by 22% for workers above 25 years old and 32% for workers under 
25 years old). Furthermore, they found that nominal base wages were reduced after 
the reform, especially in firms in which workers were represented by AP, rather than 
typical TU (around 7.4%). While there is an increasing interest in the future of 
decentralized collective bargaining outcomes in Greece (van Ours et al. 2016) little is 
known about the real effects of the 2011 reform on the wage floors. In this paper we 
extent the analysis of Daouli et al. (2016) by using a much larger dataset of firm-level 
contracts which is spanned in a longer time period (2002-2016) capturing adequately 
the firm-level bargaining landscape before and after the reform. Also, our analysis 
includes firms not engaged in decentralized negotiations that are used as a reliable 
counterfactual scenario in order to estimate the determinants of firm-level contracting 
before and after the introduction of the new labour relations framework. Finally, we 
analyse the wage adjustment process at the firm level by exploring the association of 
bargained outcomes with the labour relations reform, the role of associations of 
persons and the subsequent decrease of the NMW imposed by the government. 
Our empirical analysis is based on the development of a unique dataset containing the 
official firm-level collective agreements signed in Greece during the period 2002-
2016. The importance and superiority of contract data as compared to survey data 
while analysing downward wage rigidities has been highlighted in several seminal 
studies (Christofides and Stengos, 2003; Druant et al., 2012; Le Bihan et al., 2012). 
These firm-level agreements are publicly available in raw format by the Ministry of 
Labour, Social Security and Welfare and the Greek Organisation for Mediation and 
Arbitration (OMED). They contain detailed information for 3,893 contracts regarding 
the (a) type of representation, (b) timing and duration of each contract, (c) wage 
settlements and (e) the place of the agreement, business name and tax identification 
number of each firm. Using the latter, we matched each firm engaged in decentralized 
negotiations to additional attributes, i.e. number of employees, sectoral affiliation and 
ownership. This information is drawn from the iMentor database that covers all firms 
operating in Greece providing information on business demographics and balance 
sheet data.  
We found that firm-level contracting exhibits a substantial degree of heterogeneity 
with respect to some basic observable characteristics, i.e. firm size, location, industry, 
market power and performance indicators, and this heterogeneity becomes more 
dispersed during the post-reform period. According to our findings the objective of 
the reform to engage a higher share of firms and workers in decentralised bargaining 
has been accomplished. Furthermore, we show that the observed nominal base wage 
changes occurred mostly in firms where workers were represented by AP while the 
adjustment process in firms where workers were organized in TU has been much 
more moderate. In addition, most of the firm-level contractual agreements signed in 
the post-reform period are associated with base-wage reductions linked to firm-
specific characteristics and to the reduction of the NMW imposed by the government 
in 2012. 
The contribution of this study is threefold. First, it uses contractual data to offer a first 
formal assessment of the impact of firm level collective bargaining on wage 
adjustments in a European economy with considerable downward wage rigidities. We 
should note that while the relevant research focuses at the determinants of firm-level 
contracting in Canada, the United States and some European counties (Christofides 
and Stengos, 2003; Card and del la Rica, 2006; Avouyi-Dovi et al. 2013; Daouli, 
2013; 2016) none of them examine wage floor adjustments for a long time period 
during which a reform has implemented with a sharp reduction in the NMW. The 
importance of nation-wide base wage floor for the investigation of the determinants of 
wage floor adjustments is recently highlighted by Fougere et al. (2016) but in the 
context of industry-level agreements in France. Second, it provides detailed evidence 
on negotiated base-wage adjustments associated with a reformed collective bargaining 
regime in a recessionary period. Third, it explores the impact of a new form of 
workers’ representation (AP) on collectively bargained wage outcomes. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data and 
provides a brief description on the specific attributes of firm-level contracting before 
and after the reform. Section 3 outlines the strategy regarding the empirical modelling 
of firm-level contracting and the associated base wage adjustments. Section 4 presents 
the empirical results and Section 5 concludes. 
2 Data and descriptives 
2.1 Data Sources 
In order to examine the variation of nominal base-wage outcomes in Greece during 
the period 2002–2016 we utilize contractual data pertaining to the universe of the 
official contracts of decentralized firm-level collective agreements (firm-level 
contracts Greek database, FLCGDB). The dataset has been developed by using (a) 
information extracted from the registry maintained by the Ministry of Labour, Social 
Security and Welfare (YPAKP) for the period 2002-2008 (b) the publicly available 
agreements from the website of the Ministry of Labor, Social Security and Welfare 
covering the period 2010-2016 and (c) the publicly available agreements from the 
website of the Greek Organisation for Mediation and Arbitration (OMED) covering 
the period 2006-2016. In order to ensure that each contract is a unique entry in our 
dataset we match all contracts using the name of the firm and the signing date.  
The database contains 3,893 contracts with information on the business name, the 
place of agreement and the signing and effective dates. For those contracts signed 
during the period 2002-2005 we are not able to identify specific provisions on base 
wage outcomes since we have access only on the registry maintained by the YPAKP 
(we do not handle the core document of the contract). However, for the period 2006-
2016 we are able to extract detailed additional information on the type of 
representation (TU or AP) and base wage settlements (change and/or level of base 
wages and adoption of NMW) since those contracts are publicly available by two 
official webpages (YPAKP and OMED). For this period the number of contracts is 
3,364 and base wage provisions are included in more than 85% of the contracts 
(2,912). Regarding the period 2002-2016 we were unable to identify the tax 
identification number (based on the company name) for 220 contracts corresponding 
to 5.6% of the total sample. For those contracts with a valid tax identification number 
we were able to find for each firm the sector of economic activity (4-digit NACE Rev 
1.1.), the number of employees, the year of establishment, the legal form and the firm 
ownership status. The matching of this information was based on the tax identification 
number and it has been made possible due to the access granted from Infobank 
Hellastat S.A. (IBHS) to its iMentor online search engine. IBHS is a major business 
information provider and iMentor covers all firms operating in Greece providing 
information on their basic characteristics, balance sheet data, contact details etc. 
Given the increased incidence of decentralized agreements in the post-reform period, 
the constructed database enables us to investigate the structure of firm-level collective 
bargaining in the post reform period.   
 
2.2 Descriptive statistics 
Figure 1 displays the evolution of firm-level contracting in the Greek labour market. 
The data cover the period from 1990 when decentralized negotiations were originally 
introduced to the Greek labour relations system until 2016 which is the latest year 
available. The grey bars represent the annual number of signed firm-level agreements 
as those are provided by the registry maintained by YPAKP. The red bars represent 
the number of signed contracts according to the online OMED resources and the black 
bars represent the subset of those contracts that contain base wage provisions as there 
is a small number of agreements each year referring to organizational issues, internal 
regulations, insurance schemes etc. The total number of contracts was fairly stable 
with about 160 contracts each year during the pre-reform era. Hence, firm-level 
contracting was not very popular in the Greek labour market mostly because of the 
firm-size restriction imposed by the early 90’s industrial relations law (Law 
1876/1990). However, their number was rapidly increased in 2012 which was the first 
year of the reform (Law 4024/2011, October) and then was decreased again during the 
more recent years but to a much higher average, around 270 contracts per year, as 
compared to its pre-reform level.  
<FIGURE 1 HERE> 
Table 1 provides evidence on the structure of firm-level bargaining, using information 
from the FLCGDB for contracts with base wage settlements. We define three sub-
periods in order to show the changing structure of collective bargaining in Greece 
across periods of significant events that affected the economic activity in Greece. The 
first refers to the period 2006m1-2010m4 which is denoted as a period that has not 
affected by policy interventions in the wage formation process, the second period 
(2010m5-2011m10) refers to a pre-reform one during which a fiscal consolidation 
agenda started being implemented (1st Memorandum of Understanding between the 
Greek government and the Troika) and the third is the post-reform period (2011m11-
2016m12). For the last period descriptive statistics are disaggregated by the type of 
workers’ representation (TU or AP) since the AP is a new wage bargaining entity 
introduced by Law 4024/2011.  
Regarding the duration of firm-level contracts before the reform, the majority of them 
are one-year agreements with their frequency being increased during the second sub-
period before the reform. However, during the post-reform period, AP sign contracts 
with longer duration, i.e. more than two years, and more open-ended contracts (see 
also Figure 2). This may indicate that the formation of base wages in the framework 
of firm-level bargaining is a tool for avoiding pressure at the workplace during a 
period of increased uncertainty. The firm-size distribution of firm-level contracting 
has changed considerably between the two pre-reform sub-periods. During the first 
one, firm-level contracting was more prevalent across large firms as it was more 
likely to have their workforce organized around a TU which is also dependent on the 
number of employees. However, during the second sub-period smaller firms that were 
facing severe financial problems were also allowed to sign special firm-level 
agreements with their base wages set below the sectoral/occupational thresholds (Law 
3899/2010). As a result, nearly one half of the signed labour contracts come from the 
smaller size category while the frequency of firm-level contracting is reduced in the 
two larger size bands.  However, during the post-reform period we observe that the 
vast majority (79.5%) of small firms (1-49 employees) negotiated for base wages 
through an AP while the distribution of firm-level contracting with a TU exerts a 
higher dispersion across firm-size categories. The firm-age distribution has not 
changed very much between the two pre-reform sub-periods but in the post-reform 
period contracts signed by an AP correspond to younger firms. In addition, the 
majority of firms engaged in decentralized bargaining operate in the private sector and 
the incidence of firm-level contracting in firms affiliated with the government or local 
authorities is considerably smaller in the post-reform period. Also, contracts signed by 
APs seem to concentrate exclusively in the private sector. Regarding the legal type of 
the firm we observe that nearly 11% of contracts refer to sole proprietorships in the 
second sub-period while no contracts exist for those firms in the first-sub period.  
With respect to the sectoral distribution of firm-level contracting we observe that in 
the pre-reform period it was more evident in manufacturing firms, representing the 
30% of the total agreements. Together with the transportations sector they cover 
nearly half of firm-level agreements signed in first period. A notable difference 
appears when looking in the second period (2010m5-2011m10) where there is a sharp 
increase of firm-level contracting in the manufacturing sector due to the reduced 
contracting incidence in the transportations and nearly every other sector of economic 
activity. During the third period, the sectoral distribution of firm-level contracting the 
data exhibits a more dispersed picture where, apart from manufacturing, labour 
contracts are signed in firms operating in the wholesale and retail trade sectors as well 
as in hotels and restaurants. It should be noted that in the case of AP the majority of 
contracts found in hotels and restaurants, wholesale and retail trade and 
manufacturing. On the other hand, the majority of contracts signed by TUs comes 
from the manufacturing sector. This indicates that the changing distribution of 
contracts across sectors of economic activity is due to the introduction of APs in wage 
negotiations. Lastly, the regional distribution of decentralized bargaining in the pre-
reform period seems to be concentrated in highly urbanized areas (Attica and Central 
Macedonia) while in the post-reform period, firm-level agreements signed by APs are 
much more dispersed across regions.  
 <TABLE 1 HERE>  
<FIGURE 2 HERE> 
Figure 3 depicts the timing of firm-level contracting by focusing on the monthly 
distribution of contracts within the signing year. Panel (a) refers to the total number of 
signed contracts regardless whether they contain base wage provisions. In the pre-
reform period the majority of firm-level contracts were signed in May or June (the 
same holds for the NMW agreement). However, the introduction of Law 4024/2011 
was followed by a post-reform peak observed in December 2011 and firm-level 
contracting seems to occur in spring ever since. Looking on contracts with wage 
settlements by the type of workers’ representation (period 2006-2016) we observe that 
the peak observed in December 2011 is mainly due to firm level contracts signed by 
APs (Panel b) while firm-level agreements established by TUs peaked in July 2010 
(Panel c).  
<FIGURE 3 HERE> 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics with respect to the bargained base wage 
outcomes (change and level) by period and type of workers’ representation. During 
the first period none of the contracts signed by TUs included downward adjustments 
and the vast majority of them (98%) were associated with base wage increases. This 
resulted to an average base wage increase of 6.6%. In the second period, 6.0% of 
contracts signed by TUs set lower base wages but the majority of them (69.3%) kept 
establishing base wage increases. It should be noted that the percentage of contracts 
with unchanged wages increased to 25%. This led to an average base wage change of 
2.1%, considerably lower from the mean increase observed in the first period. An 
inversed picture emerged soon after the collective bargaining framework reform. 
Decreases in nominal base wages became more frequent in decentralized bargaining. 
More specifically, 36.3% of the total agreements led to reductions and 56.3% left 
them unchanged with the mean base wage reduction being 5.2%. Breaking down 
between TUs and APs reveals that these developments are mostly driven from 
bargaining in firms in which workers were organized in an AP. In particular, only 
4.7% of those contracts led to higher base wages and nearly half of them led to 
reductions (8.3% on average). The wage adjustment process was more moderate when 
workers were represented by a TU, since 67% of those contracts left wages unaltered 
and only 9.9% of them led to wage increases (the mean base wage reduction was 
2.7%). These differences are also found to be sound in terms of statistical 
significance, according to the reported t-statistics in the last column.  
The above evidence is also apparent in Figure 4 where we plot the firm-specific 
bargained wage changes before and after the introduction of Law 4024/2011. There is 
only a handful of downward nominal base wage adjustments observed just before the 
reform although the general trend is negative, especially after 2009, when TUs started 
agreeing upon substantially smaller increases and even wage freezes. Yet, as observed 
in Figure 4, these differences in the bargained wage outcomes between TUs and APs 
seem to have occurred mainly shortly after the reform. The reduction in base wages is 
more pronounced for contracts signed by APs as compared to those signed by TUs. In 
addition, the variation of outcomes seems to be higher in the post-reform period 
although the adjustments established by both the bargaining entities exhibit a similar 
upward trend during the most recent years of our dataset. It should be noted that this 
post-reform variation encapsulates two interrelated facts. The first, refers to the 
provisions of Law 4024/2011 regarding the ability of firm level contracts to adopt the 
NMW and the second refers to the abrupt reduction of the NMW implemented in 
February 2012. We explore these developments more formally in the empirical 
analysis that follows. 
Table 2 also presents evidence on the base wage level. There is a statistically 
significant difference between TUs and APs possibly reflecting, among other things, 
productivity differences and changing wage bargaining structures across firms (see 
also Daouli et al. 2016). According to our dataset, base wages in agreements signed 
by APs are almost 25% lower than those signed by TUs. Thus, we are able to identify 
not only the the nominal base wage change established in decentralized negotiations 
but also to measure the base wage level. 
<TABLE 2 HERE> 
<FIGURE 4 HERE> 
Figure 6 provides a vivid picture on the evolution of average nominal base wages in 
firm-level contracting in Greece during the period 2006-2016 using the NMW level as 
a comparable outcome. Data refer to the effective years of contracts and in the case of 
firm-level contracting, the unconditional mean estimate of nominal base wages (and 
its 95% confidence interval) is weighted by the number of employees at the level of 
the firm corresponding to each contract. We observe that contractual base wages in 
firms with TUs are 22% higher than the NMW both in pre- and post-reform periods 
while base wages in contracts signed by APs during the post-reform period are nearly 
identical to the NMW. This confirms the argument that the variation in the workers’ 
representation type can be used as a firm-specific attribute that may identify the 
impact of the reform on base wage adjustment in decentralized bargaining.      
<FIGURE 5 HERE> 
<FIGURE 6 HERE> 
3 Empirical Analysis 
3.1 Determinants of Firm-Level Bargaining 
While there is evidence on the determinants of firm level contracting in the relevant 
literature (Card and de la Rica, 2006), in Greece there is limited evidence due to lack 
of data (Daouli et al. 2013; 2016). The dataset developed for this study (FLCGDB) 
provides us the ability to observe whether a firm engages in decentralized collective 
bargaining (versus firms that did not participate). Hence, we rely on logistic 
regression models to estimate the probability of signing a firm-level collective 
agreement (FLC) conditional on some basic firm-specific characteristics. The baseline 
model can be specified as follows:  
Prob (FLCit=1|Xkit,YDTt)=Λ(βkXkit+γTYDTt+εit)      (1) 
where, Λ is the logistic function linking the incidence of a firm-level contract in firm i 
at year t to a vector of k observable characteristics Xkit and a vector of T year 
dummies YDTt in order to control for time effects that are common across all firms. 
The vector of observables, Xkit, includes indicators for the size of the firm as 
measured by the number of employees, the region (NUTS-II) where the firm is 
located, the 2-digit sector of economic activity (NACE Rev.1), the legal form of the 
firm, a Herfindahl-Hirschman index and indicators for the asset turnover ratio (sales 
and assets are CPI deflated, 2015=100). The last two variables have been calculated at 
the 4-digit level of economic activity and they have been included in order to control 
for the level of concentration in the market the firm is facing and its ability to make 
rent payments (Guertzgen, 2009; Breda 2015). The term εit corresponds to the 
disturbance indicator. In order to control for common variance components across 
firms, we report standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering by 
region and 2-digit sector of economic activity. All estimations are weighted using the 
number of firms by 4-digit sector of economic activity as weights. The derived vector 
of estimates γT is expected to provide us adequate evidence on the differentiated 
behaviour of firm-level contracting across years. We expect that these estimates will 
be higher in the years after the reform (2011 and onwards) compared to the years 
before the reform (2002-2010).    
However, the model specified in equation (1) is not informative about a possible 
differentiation regarding the determinants of firm-level contracting in the post-reform 
period as compared to the pre-reform one. As already shown in the descriptive 
analysis, the post-reform period has been characterized by a massive increase of firm-
level contracts where firms with different characteristics were allowed to enter the 
decentralized wage setting process. Therefore, we utilize a more flexible model 
specification with interaction effects in order to estimate whether the incidence of 
decentralized collective agreements has increased in the post-reform period and 
whether firm-specific attributes affect it in a differentiated way. Hence, instead of 
year dummy variables we introduce a post-reform indicator (PD) taking the value of 1 
for the period 2011-2015 and zero, otherwise (2002-2010). This model is specified as 
follows:  
Prob (FLCit=1|Xkit,PDt)=Λ{βkXkit+δPDt+θk(Xkit×PDt)+εi}     (2) 
The estimated value of δ will now provide evidence on whether the likelihood of 
firm-level contracting has changed in the post-reform period compared to the pre-
reform period. In addition, the vector of estimates θk will inform us on whether the 
estimated impact of observable characteristics, Xkit, is also differentiated between the 
pre- and post-reform periods.   
3.2 Nominal Base Wage Adjustments 
Next, we turn into modelling the bargained wage changes at the firm level which 
should take into account the censoring of the dependent variable. More specifically, 
base wage changes are not observed for the total sample of firms used in this study, 
but only for the sub-sample of firms engaged in decentralized collective negotiations 
at some point of time, before or after the reform. We deal with this issue using the 
two-step Heckman estimator (Heckman, 1979; Puhani, 2000) where in the first stage, 
a selection equation for the probability of a firm to engage in firm-level negotiations 
is estimated, as in model (1), and the regression equation for the bargained wage 
adjustments (given that FLC=1) is specified as follows: 
Δwit=βkXkit+γTYDTt+φ0APit+φ1NMWit 
+φT2(YDTt×APit)+ φT3(YDTt×NMWit)+μλit+uit    (3) 
where, Δwit is the bargained nominal base wage change specified in a contract 
corresponding to firm i at year t, Xkit is a vector of k observable characteristics as the 
one defined in equation (1), APit is a dummy indicator taking the value of 1 if the 
contract is signed by an AP and 0 if signed by a TU, NMWit is a dummy indicator 
taking the value of 1 if the base wage outcomes specified in the contract are explicitly 
linked to the provisions set by the national collective bargaining agreement, 
(YDTt×APi) are interaction terms that help us to uncover the evolution of bargained 
wage adjustments over time given that the collective agreement was signed by an AP, 
(YDTt×NMWit) are interaction terms that capture the changing behavior of base wage 
adjustments across time in terms of adopting the NMW, λit is the estimated non-
selection hazard (inverse Mill’s ratio) derived from estimating the selection equation 
(1), and uit is the error term. We expect that contracts signed by an AP (as compared 
to TUs) will be associated (vector of estimated effects φT2) by a much greater 
reduction in the years 2011-2013 (see Figure 4) than in the years 2014-2015 implying 
a greater downward adjustment in base wages due to the reform. We also expect that 
the downward adjustment will be affected the NMW reduction in February 2012 
which was channeled into those contracts (signed either by TUs or APs) through their 
explicit adoption of the NMW floor (vector of estimated effects φT3). Using this two-
step modelling procedure, we make an attempt to avoid any biases due to the non-
random selection of firms into this bargaining type. In this way, sample selection bias 
is corrected by taking into consideration whether a firm belongs to the non-random 
sample of contracts with base wage provisions.   
4 Estimation Results 
4.1 Determinants of Firm-Level Bargaining 
Table 4 displays the results regarding the probability of a firm to sign a firm-level 
agreement over the period 2002-2015. We model this probability by estimating 
equation (1) across several samples and weighting the regressions by the total number 
of firms by 4-digit sector of economic activity (NACE Rev.1). In column 1 we use the 
total matched sample of the firms engaged in decentralized negotiations and those that 
did not participate in this level of bargaining. Regarding the evolution of firm-level 
contracting, the probability is significantly higher in 2012, significantly lower and 
without a clear trend during the pre-reform, and not statistically different in 2013-
2014 (the comparison year is 2015). With respect to firm size, the probability of firm 
level contracting is steadily increasing with the number of employees. It is much 
smaller for those firms for which information on the number of employees is not 
available, however, these are mainly very small firms which do not publish 
information about their size. Next, we examine how the contracting probability varies 
for firms located in different geographical regions as compared to those observed in 
Attica. For example, it is more likely for a firm located in Macedonia to sign a firm-
level agreement while this is not statistically different for firms located in 
Peloponnese, West Greece and the Ionian Islands. Regarding the sectoral distribution, 
the incidence of decentralized agreements is particularly high in electricity, gas and 
water supply, hotels and restaurants and financial institutions (as compared to the 
constructions sector). A firm-level contract is more likely to be in effect in sole 
proprietorships as compared to all other legal forms. Finally, firms operating in 
sectors with a higher degree of market power are more likely to sign firm-level 
contracts while this probability is significantly lower for firms operating in low 
performance sectors (according to the asset turnover ratio). 
In model 2 the sample is restricted to exclude firms that have not published any 
balance sheet data regarding sales over a 3-year period. This criterion has been 
imposed during estimations in order to exclude firms that may have exited from the 
market. The deleted observations refer to firms that did not participated in 
decentralized bargaining since we assume that those firms that signed a firm-level 
contract during a specific year are alive. This leaves us with a sample of 458,267 
firms instead of the original one containing 1,412,052 observations. However, the 
estimated results lead to the same indications regarding the association between firm-
level contracting and observable characteristics. The only notable change is that the 
estimated parameter for sole proprietorships is much higher confirming the fact that 
those firms are very small ones and do not publish data on their size. In model 3 we 
exclude those firms for which the number of employees is not available, leading to a 
further reduction of the utilized sample to 253,340 observations. However, the 
estimated coefficients and standard errors are remarkably similar to those of the 
previous column, providing reassurance that our results are not sensitive to the lack of 
this information or the omission of those firms from the estimation sample. Finally, in 
model 4 we specify the model of the previous column but including an additional 
indicator on whether the firm was under a decentralized collective agreement during 
the previous year. As expected, it takes some bias out from nearly all the other 
estimated coefficients which still indicate towards the results already discussed. 
Moreover, the estimated coefficient of the lagged dependent variable indicates that the 
probability of firm-level contracting exhibits some degree of persistence since is 
largely determined from the existence of an agreement during the last year. 
<TABLE 4 HERE> 
Table 5 presents the estimated results of equation (2) using the adopted specification 
presented in column 4 of Table 4. This will allow us to see whether the observable 
characteristics of firms affect the probability of a firm-level collective agreement in a 
differentiated way during the post-reform period. According to the results, the 
probability of firm-level contracting is much higher after the reform and it still 
affected by the existence of an agreement in the last year although to a lesser extend 
in the second period. This implies that the persistence in frim-level bargaining 
becomes smaller in the post-reform period due to the inclusion of firms without any 
prior experience in firm-level agreements. Regarding the total number of employees, 
larger firms are less likely to sign a contract during the second period. However, 
smaller firms appear more likely to participate in decentralized negotiations given that 
Law 4024/2011 offered them this opportunity. This finding is depicted at Figure 6 
where the predicted probability of firm-level contracting before and after the reform is 
plotted across firm size (with and without accounting for dynamics). In addition, for 
firms located in certain regions, i.e. Thessaly, Central Greece, West Greece and 
Ionian Islands, the contracting probability is not changed during the post-reform 
period, however, it has increased substantially for some others, e.g. Epirus and 
Aegean Islands, and it appears to be reduced for firms located in Peloponnese. After 
the implementation of Law 4024/2011 the contracting probability is lower in sectors 
such as transportation, real estate, health, education and other community services. 
This is mostly due to the fact that under the new regime, more firms from other 
sectors (and located in regions with a low incidence of firm-level contracts) tend to 
sign collective agreements, e.g. hotels and restaurants. With respect to characteristics 
referring to the legal status of the firm or the market power and the profitability of the 
sector, there is not a statistically differentiation in the contracting probability during 
the post-reform period. 
<TABLE 5 HERE>  
<FIGURE 6 HERE> 
4.2 Nominal Base Wage Adjustments 
With respect to wage floor adjustments, Table 6 presents the results obtained from the 
estimation of equation (3) using the model specifications already presented in Table 4. 
More specifically, the results are obtained from a two-step Heckman selection model 
which corrects for the probability of a firm to engage in decentralized bargaining in 
the first stage. Since we are interested in the impact of the interaction terms we do not 
present estimates for the rest of the variables utilized during estimations. Focusing on 
the estimated effects of the interaction of the AP indicator with the year binary 
indicators, we show that that a reduction of 6.1% in the nominal base wages originates 
in 2012 which was the first year after the reform while no further adjustment is 
evident during the remaining years. This result is stable across different model 
specifications and sub-samples. With regard to the interaction effects between the 
indicator denoting adoption of the NMW and the year dummies we found that 
contracts linking their base wages to the existing NMW conditions, experience a 
further reduction of approximately 11% in base wages during 2011 and 2012. This 
finding is confirmed across all models reported in Table 6 and there is no evidence for 
further nominal base wage changes in most recent years. This is also apparent in 
Figure 7 where we have plotted the predicted base wage levels established after 
negotiations with TUs and APs, alongside with the evolution of the NMW. Base wage 
adjustments in firms where workers are represented by APs are following closely the 
evolution of the NMW. Moreover, the major adjustment process in those firms 
occurred in 2012 and no significant changes are observed since then. At the same 
time, a sizeable base wage premium is observed for workers in firms where workers 
have formed typical TUs instead of APs (around 22%). This premium seems to be 
quite stable in the periods before and after the reform, although a much smaller 
adjustment process has taken place in those firms as well after 2010. 
<FIGURE 7 HERE> 
5 Conclusions 
This study investigates nominal contractual base-wage adjustments in Greece 
associated with the 2011 industrial relations reform. The reform redefined the limits 
within which base wages can oscillate and allowed to workers’ associations to 
negotiate for wages at the firm level. The assessment covers the period 2002–2016 
and is based on information extracted from the universe of firm-level contracts signed 
in this period. According to our results, the number of firm-level contracts increased 
dramatically shortly after the reform, now covering a larger pool of workers, 
especially from smaller firms. In order to examine the determinants of firm-level 
contracting, we matched the firms engaged in decentralized negotiations with firms 
that did not (2002-2015) and provided evidence on the factors shaping the incidence 
of a firm-level agreement. Furthermore, we showed that this probability is increased 
after the reform and its determinants appear to be differentiated between the pre and 
the post-reform period, especially regarding firm size and sector of economic activity.  
With respect to the nominal base wage adjustments, we provided evidence regarding 
two very important features of the post-reform era, i.e. the ability of workers in small 
firms to form associations of employees and negotiate over wage issues and the sharp 
decrease in the national minimum wage in 2012. Taking into account the selection of 
firms into the decentralized level of collective bargaining, we showed that nominal 
base wage reductions are higher when workers are represented by an association of 
persons rather than a typical trade union. Moreover, our results indicate that these 
reductions occurred shortly after the reform without significant changes being 
observed in most recent years. From a policy perspective, firm-level bargaining with 
trade unions is expected to promote decentralized bargaining with outcomes linked to 
firm-specific characteristics. 
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Figures & Tables 
Figure 1 Evolution of firm-level contracting in Greece (1990-2016) 
 
Source: Ministry of Labor, Social Security and Welfare and OMED (authors' calculations). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Duration of wage-setting firm-level contracts in Greece (2006-2016) 
(a) Contact duration (in years) by the effective (starting) year of contract 
 
(b) Frequency of open-ended contracts by the effective (starting) year of contract 
 
Source: Ministry of Labor, Social Security and Welfare and OMED (authors' calculations). 
 
 
Figure 3 Timing of firm level contracts in Greece (2002-2016) 
(a) All firm-level contracts 
 
(b) Base wage-setting contracts signed by trade unions 
 
(c) Base wage-setting contracts signed by associations of persons 
 Source: Ministry of Labor, Social Security and Welfare and OMED (authors' calculations). 
 
Figure 4 Nominal base wage changes by type of workers’ representation 
before and after the reform 
 
Source: Ministry of Labor, Social Security and Welfare and OMED (authors' calculations). 
Notes: Black vertical line specified at 2011m11 indicates the introduction of Law 4024/2011. The 
blue line is a fitted local polynomial for base wage changes singed in firms with trade unions. The red 
line is a fitted local polynomial for base wage changes signed in firms with associations of persons. 
Figure 4 National minimum wage and base wages by type of workers’ 
representation 
 
Source: Ministry of Labor, Social Security and Welfare and OMED (authors' calculations). 
Notes: Data on the National Minimum Wage are derived by the official documents of the national 
collective bargaining agreements. Regarding firm-level contracts, lines correspond to the 
unconditional mean estimates of nominal base wages for contracts signed by trade unions (TU) or 
associations of persons (AP). Data are weighted by the firm size as measured by the number of 
employees. Dotted lines refer to the lower and upper 95% CIs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 Predicted probability of firm-level contracting across the firm-size 
distribution before and after the reform 
(a) Static model (b) Dynamic model 
  
Source: Ministry of Labor, Social Security and Welfare and OMED (authors' calculations). 
Notes: 
 
 
Figure 6 National minimum wage and predicted base wage levels by type of 
workers’ representation before and after the reform 
 
Source: Ministry of Labor, Social Security and Welfare and OMED (authors' calculations). 
Notes: 
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Table 1 Frequencies of firm-level contracts by period, worker representation 
type and firm-level characteristics 
 Pre-reform sub-periods Post-reform period 
 2006m1-2010m4 2010m5-2011m10 2011m11-2016m12 
 
TU1 TU AP1 
Contract duration 
1 year or less 57.7 69.8 48.8 35.3 
More than 1 year - 2 years or less  32.1 14.3 28.2 21.0 
More than 2 years - 3 years or less  3.4 7.2 11.6 27.1 
More than 3 years - 4 years or less  1.6 1.1 0.9 5.5 
More than 4 years 5.1 7.6 10.5 11.3 
Firm size     
1-49 employees 4.9 45.7 22.5 79.5 
50-249 employees 36.9 23.0 30.7 12.0 
≥250 employees 48.0 29.8 41.7 1.4 
Unknown 10.2 1.5 5.2 7.0 
Firm age     
0-5 years 4.7 5.6 2.7 8.5 
6-10 years 19.9 10.9 4.6 17.3 
≥11 years 73.4 72.4 85.8 59.3 
Unknown 2.0 10.9 6.9 14.9 
Ownership status     
Private 58.5 83.0 71.9 94.7 
Government/State control 22.6 5.6 10.9 0.2 
Local authority 12.6 7.2 4.4 0.9 
Other 6.3 4.1 12.7 4.2 
Legal form     
Sole proprietorship 0.0 10.6 4.9 9.4 
Sector      
Mining & quarrying .08 1.1 2.2 0.4 
Manufacturing 32.8 61.2 43.9 24.4 
Electricity, gas & water supply 10.7 6.0 5.6 0.1 
Constructions 0.8 0.7 1.0 2.6 
Wholesale & retail trade 5.9 4.6 9.5 27.5 
Hotels & restaurants 2.6 1.4 5.9 29.1 
Transportations 16.2 7.1 9.7 4.0 
Financial institutions 6.5 2.5 4.7 0.7 
Real estate 5.3 4.6 7.5 5.7 
Public administration 2.2 1.4 1.2 0.0 
Education 3.0 1.8 1.5 0.6 
Health 4.1 3.2 4.1 3.4 
Other community services 8.9 4.3 3.0 1.3 
Region     
East Macedonia & Thrace 4.7 5.3 5.4 6.4 
Central Macedonia 15.2 8.9 15.0 29.6 
West Macedonia 0.0 0.4 0.7 0.2 
Thessaly 2.8 2.5 5.0 6.9 
Epirus 1.2 0.4 1.7 5.2 
Ionian Islands 0.4 0.7 0.7 0.3 
West Greece 6.5 4.6 5.9 2.9 
Central Greece 5.5 2.5 4.5 1.9 
Peloponnese 4.9 3.2 3.4 1.3 
Attica 51.7 67.8 48.4 27.4 
North Aegean 0.4 0.0 1.4 0.5 
South Aegean 2.2 1.1 0.6 9.4 
Crete 4.5 2.5 7.2 8.0 
Source: Ministry of Labor, Social Security and Welfare and OMED (authors' calculations). 
Notes: Raw frequencies (%) calculated using the unweighted sample of firm-level contracts. 1 AP: Association of 
persons, TU: Trade union. 
 
 Table 2 Firm-level negotiated nominal base-wage adjustments: Summary statistics by 
worker representation type before and after the reform 
 Pre-reform sub-periods Post-reform period 
 
2006m1-
2010m4 
2010m5-
2011m10 
2011m11-2016m1 
 TU1 All contracts TU AP1 Diff: AP-TU t-stat 
Extensive Margin (%)        
Downward adjustment 0.0 6.0 36.3 23.2 50.3 27.1*** 11.3 
Unchanged 1.8 24.7 56.3 67.0 45.0 -21.9*** -8.7 
Upward adjustment 98.2 69.3 7.4 9.9 4.7 -5.1*** -3.8 
Number of contracts 498 251 1,480 760 720 - - 
Intensive Margin (%)        
Mean 6.6 2.1 -5.2 -2.7 -8.3 -5.5*** -10.3 
Median 5.7 2.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 - - 
Standard deviation 4.4 4.7 10.2 7.6 11.9 - - 
Number of contracts 454 244 1,349 748 601 - - 
Monthly nominal base wage (€)        
Mean 894.0 1149.2 696.1 894.3 605.4 -288.9*** -24.9 
Median 585.6 1339.8 568.1 820.0 586.1 - - 
Standard deviation 230.3 243.8 205.1 262.6 62.7 - - 
Number of contracts 239 201 1,679 527 1,152 - - 
Source: Ministry of Labor, Social Security and Welfare and OMED (authors' calculations). 
Notes: Raw estimates calculated using the unweighted sample of firm-level contracts with base wage provisions. 1 AP: Association of 
persons, TU: Trade union. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 Determinants of firm-level contracting 
Independent variable [1] [2] [3] [4] 
Sign year: 2002 -1.942***(0.326) -2.200***(0.329) -2.199***(0.331) - 
Sign year: 2003 -2.052***(0.232) -2.310***(0.232) -2.332***(0.233) -2.348***(0.230) 
Sign year: 2004 -1.850***(0.358) -2.106***(0.349) -2.131***(0.352) -1.829***(0.382) 
Sign year: 2005 -2.033***(0.447) -2.348***(0.438) -2.341***(0.440) -2.168***(0.481) 
Sign year: 2006 -1.810***(0.393) -2.126***(0.386) -2.131***(0.389) -1.956***(0.404) 
Sign year: 2007 -1.907***(0.360) -2.222***(0.357) -2.218***(0.360) -2.056***(0.369) 
Sign year: 2008 -1.751***(0.391) -2.120***(0.376) -2.111***(0.378) -1.913***(0.395) 
Sign year: 2009 -2.079***(0.409) -2.449***(0.393) -2.440***(0.395) -2.356***(0.409) 
Sign year: 2010 -1.911***(0.579) -2.280***(0.565) -2.272***(0.567) -2.321***(0.465) 
Sign year: 2011 -1.520***(0.394) -1.878***(0.384) -1.879***(0.387) -1.584***(0.427) 
Sign year: 2012 1.212***(0.254) 0.852***(0.243) 0.862***(0.246) 1.079***(0.311) 
Sign year: 2013 0.259(0.257) -0.101(0.256) -0.0910(0.257) -0.789***(0.260) 
Sign year: 2014 -0.127(0.216) -0.141(0.220) -0.137(0.222) -0.336(0.321) 
Firm size: 1-9 employees -5.115***(0.587) -4.690***(0.613) -4.694***(0.610) -3.764***(0.455) 
Firm size: 10-19 employees -3.660***(0.580) -3.501***(0.605) -3.506***(0.601) -2.839***(0.450) 
Firm size: 20-49 employees -3.735***(0.612) -3.483***(0.631) -3.487***(0.628) -2.808***(0.486) 
Firm size: 50-99 employees -2.958***(0.688) -2.704***(0.685) -2.706***(0.683) -2.008***(0.528) 
Firm size: 100-249 employees -2.354***(0.638) -2.106***(0.659) -2.107***(0.657) -1.621***(0.534) 
Firm size: 250-499 employees -2.419***(0.763) -1.894***(0.698) -1.894***(0.697) -1.525**(0.630) 
Firm size: 500-999 employees -0.564(0.793) -0.370(0.819) -0.366(0.819) -0.327(0.649) 
Firm size: Unknown -10.85***(0.706) -9.800***(0.734) - - 
Region: East Macedonia & Thrace 1.690***(0.285) 1.603***(0.255) 1.612***(0.255) 1.419***(0.195) 
Region: Central & West Macedonia 1.224***(0.201) 1.200***(0.181) 1.204***(0.181) 1.132***(0.160) 
Region: Thessaly 0.758**(0.378) 0.865**(0.344) 0.873**(0.345) 0.832***(0.306) 
Region: Epirus 1.468***(0.270) 1.427***(0.293) 1.431***(0.293) 1.336***(0.185) 
Region: West Greece & Ionian Islands -0.201(0.609) -0.199(0.595) -0.191(0.596) -0.251(0.587) 
Region: Central Greece 0.963**(0.397) 0.876**(0.341) 0.882***(0.342) 1.050***(0.332) 
Region: Peloponnese 0.477(0.346) 0.435(0.329) 0.444(0.328) 0.536(0.326) 
Region: Aegean Islands 1.035***(0.206) 0.923***(0.191) 0.927***(0.191) 0.819***(0.177) 
Region: Crete 0.409*(0.214) 0.318(0.197) 0.322(0.197) 0.561***(0.177) 
Sector: Manufacturing 1.356***(0.279) 1.414***(0.278) 1.412***(0.279) 0.988***(0.211) 
Sector: Electricity, gas & water supply 2.253***(0.395) 2.271***(0.467) 2.337***(0.474) 1.666***(0.472) 
Sector: Wholesale & retail trade 0.322*(0.169) 0.542***(0.156) 0.543***(0.156) 0.467***(0.152) 
Sector: Hotels & restaurants 2.115***(0.208) 2.199***(0.206) 2.229***(0.206) 1.642***(0.201) 
Sector: Transportation 1.017***(0.271) 1.218***(0.284) 1.234***(0.284) 0.932***(0.267) 
Sector: Financial institutions 2.010***(0.495) 2.270***(0.508) 2.305***(0.507) 1.572***(0.422) 
Sector: Real estate 1.347***(0.297) 1.324***(0.315) 1.311***(0.317) 1.023***(0.262) 
Sector: Health, education 1.722***(0.240) 1.601***(0.246) 1.578***(0.250) 1.095***(0.253) 
Sector: Other community services 1.674***(0.349) 1.925***(0.360) 1.937***(0.360) 1.314***(0.323) 
Legal form: Sole proprietorship 0.647**(0.253) 2.520***(0.255) 2.503***(0.257) 0.986**(0.414) 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index 0.567**(0.232) 0.689**(0.335) 0.683**(0.333) 0.615***(0.214) 
Asset Turnover Ratio <25% -0.487**(0.227) -0.802***(0.215) -0.834***(0.215) -0.535***(0.182) 
Asset Turnover Ratio >75% -0.0351(0.156) -0.221(0.151) -0.241(0.152) -0.191(0.132) 
Firm-level contract in previous year - - - 4.000***(0.276) 
Constant -2.169***(0.630) -1.624**(0.649) -1.625**(0.647) -2.583***(0.557) 
Observations 1,412,052 458,267 253,340 236,216 
Source: OMED, iMentor 
Notes: Parameter estimates from weighted logit regressions using the number of firms by 4-digit sector of economic activity as 
weights. Standard errors in parentheses are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering by region (NUTS-II) and 2-digit 
sector of economic activity (NACE Rev.1). ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. For groups of variables, the base categories are as follows: 2005, more than 1,000 employees, Attica, 
Constructions, ≥25% Asset Turnover Ratio <75% (sales and assets are CPI deflated, 2015=100). 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 Determinants of firm-level contracting in the post-reform period: Estimates 
from a fully interacted model 
Independent variable Estimated coefficient Standard error 
Law 4024/2011 2.640** (1.196) 
Firm-level contract in previous year 4.692*** (0.363) 
Law4024/11×Firm-level contract in previous year -1.717*** (0.425) 
Law4024/11×Firm size: 1-9 employees 0.400 (0.751) 
Law4024/11× Firm size: 10-19 employees 0.430 (0.748) 
Law4024/11× Firm size: 20-49 employees -1.086 (0.710) 
Law4024/11× Firm size: 50-99 employees -2.186*** (0.681) 
Law4024/11× Firm size: 100-249 employees -1.431* (0.801) 
Law4024/11× Firm size: 250-499 employees -1.282* (0.733) 
Law4024/11× Firm size: 500-999 employees -1.202 (0.735) 
Law4024/11×Region: East Macedonia & Thrace 1.662*** (0.600) 
Law4024/11×Region: Central & West Macedonia 1.109*** (0.351) 
Law4024/11×Region: Thessaly 1.046 (0.666) 
Law4024/11×Region: Epirus 2.092** (0.932) 
Law4024/11×Region: West Greece & Ionian Islands -0.360 (0.366) 
Law4024/11×Region: Central Greece 0.592 (0.692) 
Law4024/11×Region: Peloponnese -1.775*** (0.382) 
Law4024/11×Region: Aegean Islands 3.210*** (0.909) 
Law4024/11×Region: Crete 0.850*** (0.322) 
Law4024/11×Sector: Manufacturing -1.117 (0.684) 
Law4024/11×Sector: Electricity, gas & water supply -0.886 (0.959) 
Law4024/11×Sector: Wholesale & retail trade -0.560 (0.700) 
Law4024/11×Sector: Hotels & restaurants 0.594 (0.729) 
Law4024/11×Sector: Transportation -1.710** (0.687) 
Law4024/11×Sector: Financial institutions -0.642 (0.984) 
Law4024/11×Sector: Real estate -1.579** (0.656) 
Law4024/11×Sector: Health, education -1.300** (0.643) 
Law4024/11×Sector: Other community services -1.925*** (0.661) 
Law4024/11×Legal form: Sole proprietorship -0.665 (0.934) 
Law4024/11×Herfindahl-Hirschman index -0.201 (0.123) 
Law4024/11×Asset Turnover Ratio <25% -0.581 (0.444) 
Law4024/11×Asset Turnover Ratio >75% 0.323 (0.397) 
Law4024/11×Time trend 0.053 (0.089) 
Constant -5.244*** (0.772) 
Observations 236,216 
Source: OMED, iMentor 
Notes: Parameter estimates from weighted logit regressions using the number of firms by 4-digit sector of economic 
activity as weights. The model includes the same set of independent variables as in Column 4 of Table 3 (except year 
dummies). Standard errors in parentheses are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering by region (NUTS-II) and 2-
digit sector of economic activity (NACE Rev.1). ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
level, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 5 Nominal base wage adjustments in firm-level collective bargaining 
Independent variable [1] [2] [3] [4] 
 Association of persons (interaction with year effects) 
Sign year: 2011 -2.632 (3.394) -2.498 (2.395) -2.945 (2.430) -2.849 (2.710) 
Sign year: 2012 -7.518*** (2.724) -7.120*** (1.690) -7.541*** (1.707) -6.091*** (1.834) 
Sign year: 2013 0.269 (2.998) 0.517 (1.853) 0.109 (1.871) 0.081 (1.999) 
Sign year: 2014 1.360 (3.097) 1.397 (1.945) 0.955 (1.953) 0.673 (2.054) 
 Adoption of National Minimum Wage (interaction with year effects) 
Sign year: 2011 -5.729 (4.137) -5.845** (2.512) -5.206** (2.538) -5.069* (2.761) 
Sign year: 2012 -5.800** (2.713) -5.855*** (1.693) -5.187*** (1.709) -5.980*** (1.857) 
Sign year: 2013 -1.775 (3.027) -1.824 (1.872) -1.186 (1.891) -1.740 (2.021) 
Sign year: 2014 -0.672 (3.103) -0.665 (1.951) -0.178 (1.958) 0.311 (2.073) 
Mills’ ratio (lambda) -33.117 (25.739) -19.145 (12.330) -17.942 (11.929) -0.742*** (0.272) 
Wald chi-squared 432.86*** 1140.43*** 1193.78*** 1444.25*** 
Total observations 1,007,665 337,697 184,803 184,493 
Censored observations 1,005,942 335,974 183,085 183,085 
Uncensored observations 1,723 1,723 1,718 1,408 
Source: OMED, iMentor 
Notes: Estimations are based on a two-step Heckman selection model. Model specifications [1]-[4] correspond to those of Table 3. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. 
 
